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Abstract. How is pictorial relief represented in visual awareness? Certainly not as a “depth map,” but 
perhaps as a map of local surface attitudes (Koenderink & van Doorn, 1995). Here we consider the 
possibility that observers might instead, or concurrently, represent local surface shape, a geometrical 
invariant with respect to motions. Observers judge local surface shape, in a picture of a piece of 
sculpture, on a five-point categorical scale. Categories are cap–ridge–saddle–rut–cup–flat, where 
“flat” denotes the absence of shape. We find that observers readily perform such a task, with full 
resolution of a shape index scale (cap–ridge–saddle–rut–cup), and with excellent self-consistency 
over days. There exist remarkable inter-observer differences. Over a group of 10 naive observers we 
find that the dispersion of judgments peaks at the saddle category. There may be a relation of this 
finding to the history of the topic—Alberti’s (1827) omission of the saddle category in his purportedly 
exhaustive catalog of local surface shapes.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Consideration involving “pictorial space”
“Pictorial space” is an aspect of visual awareness, when the awareness is in pictorial mode. It fre-
quently happens when you look “into,” as opposed to “at,” pictures (Ames, 1925a, 1925b; Claparède, 
1904; Enright, 1991; Hildebrand, 1893; Koenderink, van Doorn, & Wagemans, 2011; Pollack, 1955; 
Schlosberg, 1941; Schwartz, 1971), but it may also happen when you look “into” the clouds, or “into” 
a dirty old wall (Leonardo da Vinci, 1651). Pictorial awareness appears categorically different from 
more frequent modes of visual awareness. Unfortunately, it is not always obvious how to identify the 
nature of the awareness in experimental phenomenology. Observers monitor the mode of their present 
visual awareness as a level of momentary reality.
Consider some of the major differences between “generic,” and pictorial visual awareness. In 
daily interactions with the physical environment the eyes play an important role, even though one is 
not immediately aware of their functions at any moment. Most visual processes run automatically, 
independent of awareness. This is the major function of the eyes from the perspective of biological 
fitness. Theories of enactive perception (Gibson, 1950) apply. In the cases of “good looks,” or even 
scrutiny, visual awareness remains closely tied to the environment. The visual ego-center (“eye” for 
short) is experienced as being “in,” or “part of” that environment. Objects in visual awareness are in 
the same space as the eye. They are experienced as having backsides, even if one momentarily sees 
only their frontsides. That is because one may change perspective voluntarily, and reckon with others 
having a different perspective. Man shares this type of awareness with all other vertebrates (Spelke, 
2000; Vallortigara, Chiandetti, Rugani, Sovrano, & Regolin, 2010).
a Pion publication
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Figure 1. Left: on the poster (designed by Alfred Leete, first appeared as cover of “London Opinion,” on the 5th 
of September 1914) Lord Kitchener points right at you, quite independent of the perspective you take. This shows 
vividly that pictorial space is not “connected” to the space you move in. Center: Magritte “The Schoolmaster” 
(1954). Notice that there is no geometrical transformation of pictorial space that will allow you to see the face. 
Right: illustration (“Full muscular detail”) from Rimmer’s Art Anatomy (1877), drawn from the imagination. This 
evokes the impression of a highly articulated pictorial relief. Notice how local shape varies from point to point 
over the surface.
These observations are crucial in understanding the pictorial mode. In pictorial mode one can-
not voluntarily change the physical perspective, although the mental perspective (Koenderink, van 
Doorn, Kappers, & Todd, 2001) may vary. Such a change of mental perspective cannot reveal novel 
geometrical aspects. The eye is not in pictorial space. It is “elsewhere” in the sense that it is logically 
impossible for the eye to be in pictorial space. This is different from being outside a house, which one 
may simply re-enter. Nothing in physical space is in pictorial space, not even the picture surface if 
there is one. That is why Lord Kitchener (in Figure 1 left) always points right at any observer, even 
when they view it from an awkward angle.
In summary, pictorial space is a mental entity, without proper physical “cause.” The picture of a 
horse is not a physical horse, but a piece of paper covered with some arrangement of pigments. Thus 
pictorial objects have to be studied through methods of experimental phenomenology. Moreover, as 
discussed above, the geometry of pictorial space is not Euclidean. Empirical methods have to take 
this into account. We have developed a battery of empirical methods in the past. This project is still in 
a continual stage of development. At this moment our understanding of pictorial space, and pictorial 
reliefs, is still very incomplete.
1.2 Representation of pictorial relief: Planelets and surflets
In this study we aim to study a novel method, designed to probe properties of opaque pictorial objects. 
Such objects are experienced as volumetrically complete—even though they lack backsides—spatial 
entities, perceived through their frontal surfaces, usually denoted as “pictorial reliefs.” These objects 
have locations, spatial attitudes, and shapes, although these geometrical entities lack proper physical 
counterparts.
Since the physical eye, and the pictorial object are mutually “elsewhere,” there exists no rational 
way to define a “distance” between them (Koenderink et al., 2011). In some sense the eye is at “infinite” 
distance from any pictorial location. However, pictorial objects do have mutually different locations. 
This is perhaps somewhat understandable in the case of the fronto-parallel dimensions—although one 
might rightfully object to this relation being trivial (Lotze, 1852)—but it is certainly problematic in the 
case of the “third” dimension. This latter dimension is conventionally known as “depth” (Koenderink 
et al., 2011). Absolute depth is a non-entity, but depth differences between pictorial locations make 
sense. The length unit is certainly incommensurable with that applied in the fronto-parallel though. 
Thus one prefers to conceive of pictorial space as “211”, rather than three-dimensional.
On the basis of a large body of empirical data, we have formulated a geometry of pictorial space 
with excellent descriptive and predictive power (Koenderink & van Doorn, 2012). It is a non-Euclidean 
geometry of a very simple type, in that the third dimension is isotropic (Bell, 1998; Strubecker, 1941, 
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1942a, 1942b, 1944; Yaglom, 1979). That it is non-Euclidean should be intuitively obvious from the 
fact that full turns about fronto-parallel axes do not exist in this space: if one looks at a portrait in 
en face pose, one is forever unable to see the back of the head (and vice versa, see Figure 1 center). 
Why? Because it was never painted in the first place! But in Euclidean geometry full turns about arbi-
trary axes are nothing special, hence the problem.
In a scientific investigation one desires to simplify things as much as possible, without losing the 
relevant aspects in the process. In geometry one of such attempts is to zoom in on local structure—so-
called “differential geometry” (Coxeter, 1961).
The most local description of a narrow region on a surface is its location. This approximates the 
surface as a single point, for formal reasons it is known as the “zeroth order” approximation (Bell, 
1998). The surface then exists as a “depth map.” The next stage in articulation is to consider the local 
spatial attitude. One considers the local surface as a “planelet” (Barrow, 1735). This is the “first order” 
approximation. To treat the globe as flat—as our ancestors did—is to stick to the first order. The next 
stage in articulation is to consider the local deviations from planarity. One considers the local surface 
as a “surflet.” This is the “second order” approximation.
Planelets are fully described by their spatial attitude, say slant and tilt. For surflets the number of 
possibilities multiplies. In the case of the globe, one would recognize it as spherical. The first visual 
round-up is due to Alberti (1436), who recognizes such surflets as “like the outside of egg shells,” “like 
the inside of egg shells,” “like columns,” “like the inside of reeds,” and “like a water surface.” These 
possibilities are qualitatively distinct, as opposed to the lower orders, where the various cases are only 
quantitatively different. This was generally affirmed for several centuries, till Gauss (1827) published 
his catalog, which added “like a horse’s saddle.” Of course, Gauss’ paper is framed in terms of math-
ematical formalism. Alberti thinks of shape like a continuously distributed surface quality, much like 
color, a surflet map.
Formally, the “quality” that one colloquially calls “shape” can be indexed through the signs of 
the curvatures of two mutually orthogonal sections. Generic possibilities are (Figure 2) 11 (cap, 
that is “like the outside of egg shells”), 12 (saddle, that is “like a horse’s saddle”) and 2 2 (cup, 
that is “like the inside of egg shells”), with transitional forms 10 (ridge, that is “like columns”), 
and 20 (ruts, that is “like the inside of reeds”). A non-generic case is 00 (flat, that is “like a water 
surface”), which is actually a quantitative, rather than qualitative distinction (see Appendix at 
http://i-perception.perceptionweb.com/journal/I/volume/5/article/i0659). The generic surflets occur 
over areas, whereas the transitional forms occur on certain special curves bounding such areas (see 
Appendix).
1.3 Aim of the present study
It is not known how reliefs are represented in human vision. Obvious possibilities are in terms of 
depth maps, planelet maps, surflet maps, and so forth. Figure 3 illustrates some of these possibilities. 
A surface represented by a finite number of points, or depth values, is fully determined. A surface 
represented through a planelet map is somewhat ambiguous, in the sense that its overall depth is inde-
terminate. A surface represented through a surflet map is even more ambiguous, in the sense that both 
its overall depth and overall slant are indeterminate. Whatever the representation, observers will be 
able to judge other quantities, up to the ambiguities mentioned above. However, such quantities have 
Figure 2. Examples of the generic surflets. From left to right: CAP (11, “like the outside of egg shells”), RIDGE 
(10, “like columns”), SADDLE (12, “like a horse’s saddle”), RUT (20, “like the inside of reeds”), and CUP 
(2 2, “like the inside of egg shells”). Ridge and rut are transitional forms that occur on the common boundaries 
of areas of saddles, and areas of cups or caps.
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to be derived from the basic representation, thus they cannot be more precisely determined than that. 
Empirically, we know that observers are unable to judge absolute depth, but can judge relative depths 
(Koenderink & van Doorn, 1995). They can also judge surface attitude (Koenderink, van Doorn, & 
Kappers, 1992) and shape (this paper).
For the sake of clarity, Figure 3 shows a one-dimensional “image.” The vertical direction rep-
resents the depth domain. Although this suffices to make basic conceptual points, it fails to show 
an important complication that occurs in higher dimensional cases. Especially the two-dimensional 
(“image”) case is important here. A planelet map does not necessarily “mesh” into an integral surface. 
There exists an integratability constraint, namely the planelet map should be a gradient field, or be 
“curl-free” (a curl-free field has no vortices; Spivak, 1999; see Figure 4.) This can be empirically 
tested (Koenderink et al., 1992), and is one of the most important indicators for the nature of the 
relief representation. A similar condition has to be met in the case of surflets. In the case of Euclidean 
geometry, the surflet map has to satisfy the so-called “Codazzi–Mainardi equations” (Codazzi, 1868, 
Figure 3. In the left column we show likely relief representations: depth maps (zeroth order), planelet maps (first 
order), and surflet maps (second order). Of course, even higher order representations are possible! In the second 
column we show a possible awareness, a smooth relief, based on the finite representation. In the third column we 
show another—equally possible—interpretation. Only the absolute depth map (order 0) is fully determinate. In 
the planelet representation (order 1) absolute depth is indeterminate, in the surflet representation (order 2) both 
absolute depth and overall attitude are indeterminate. These are useful thought models; reality might well be a 
mixture of diverse, incomplete representations.
Figure 4. An example of a circular string of planelets, taken from a planelet map that fails to “mesh.” Notice 
that the adjacent planelets A and B are far from a coplanar condition. This happens when a planelet map is not a 
gradient field, or “curl free.” In such a case there does not exist an integral surface, thus not a depth map.
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1869; Mainardi, 1856; Spivak, 1999). This is—again—up to empirical test, at least in principle. In the 
case of the geometry of pictorial space, the formal condition is slightly simpler. Details are available 
in textbooks (e.g., Sachs, 1990).
We have investigated the meshing of observed planelet maps, and found that the integratability 
condition is met within the empirical spread (Koenderink et al., 1992). We have also been able to show 
that empirically planelet maps are more precise than relative depth maps (Koenderink & van Doorn, 
1995). Might surflet maps be sufficient to “explain” planelet maps? Yes, that is to say, up to an overall 
ambiguity of spatial attitude. This is perhaps okay, since we often find idiosyncratic overall attitude 
variations in empirical planelet maps. A formal argument in favor of a surflet representation is that 
shape is an invariant over arbitrary motions. Translation will affect location, and rotations will affect 
spatial attitude, but shapes remain unaffected. This might be an advantage where mental models are 
concerned.
Although extremely important from a conceptual perspective, it will take much effort to make 
progress towards an answer. In this paper we only attempt a first step, in that we construct methods to 
sample surflet maps.
1.4 Proposed method to sample surflet representations
Consider some generic relief. An example would be the pictorial relief evoked by a photograph, draw-
ing, or painting of some articulate object, like a sculptural representation of a human torso. The exam-
ple shown in Figure 1 (right) provides an instance. In such a relief the local shape varies continuously 
from location to location. A point on such a surface is at some depth, the planelet at the point has some 
spatial attitude, and the surflet at the point has some shape. The shape is the local variation of the 
planelets, the planelet the local variation of the depth. A really large neighborhood will reveal a vari-
ation of surflets, a very restricted neighborhood may show only irrelevant textural variation, thus the 
scale, that is the size of the relevant region of interest, is a crucial parameter (see Appendix).
In sampling a surface one uses a grid of sample points, the grid spacing setting the scale at which 
the sampling proceeds. In a typical experiment one may consider a grid of a hundred to a thousand 
points, thus the scale is limited to roughly a few up to 10 percent of the width of the pictorial object. Of 
course, here the “sampling” is a property of the experimental paradigm. It is quite unclear how much 
of the image is “used” by the observer to arrive at a “local” judgment. Moreover, this is not something 
that we can ascertain from the present investigation. On the one hand, the obvious shape variations 
over the depicted object suggest that the area available for a “measurement” is rather limited. On the 
other hand, it is intuitively clear that observers would be at a loss when you would mask all of the 
image except this crucial area. This is conceptually a very difficult problem. We have explained the 
formal issues in the Appendix. One finds that there is always a fairly well-defined “footprint” that is 
required, although much larger areas, perhaps even the whole image, are probably needed to provide 
the necessary context. For instance, if the major cue is shading, the context might be the direction of 
illumination. Notice that an estimate of the direction of illumination requires an understanding of the 
shape map. Thus the issue is a very involved one. We leave it for future investigation.
In the simplest case one indicates a location on the relief and asks the observer to specify the 
nature of the shape of the relief in the immediate neighborhood of that location. For instance, it may be 
seen as “convex” (like the outside of egg shells), and so forth. In order to turn this simple task into a 
formal method of “measurement,” one needs to provide a formal scale. This is the nature of the method 
we propose here.
Technically, one uses the ratio of extremal sectional curvatures to define a size-independent shape 
measure. This “shape index” (Koenderink, 1990; Koenderink & van Doorn, 1992) is defined on a 
closed linear interval, with the cap and cup at its extremities, the symmetrical saddle at the center. 
There exists a natural symmetry about the center, since shapes situated at mutually symmetric points 
are related as a plaster cast with its mold. Thus, for instance, cup and cap are related in this way, 
whereas the symmetrical saddle is congruent to its own mold.
Although this is a continuous scale, it can be coarse-grained into natural categories. This is done 
by noting the signs of the extremal curvatures. Notice that one needs some convention, say curva-
ture reckoned positive for convexity, negative for concavity. This yields the ridges and ruts as natu-
ral anchors between the center and the end-points of the scale. Then the cap–ridge–saddle–rut–cup 
sequence appears as a natural set of shape categories. It is the scale that was illustrated above in 
Figure 2.
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This should not be interpreted such that “ridge” (for instance) implies that one principal curvature 
would be identically zero. Indeed, that would make no sense, because it would indicate a singular 
case, thus an empty category. One should understand “ridge” as a central item in its category. Some 
things are perceptually more “ridge” than either “cap” or “saddle.” Such things are immediately obvi-
ous to the observer in the actual task, but we noticed that it leads to formal misunderstandings by col-
leagues who merely conceptually think about, rather than perform the task.
In this first investigation of surflet maps, or “shape landscapes,” we ask observers to categorize 
local shape on this categorical scale. This scale is augmented with a “flat” category, required because 
observers cannot always detect a curvature. Planarity is not a shape, no shape index can be assigned 
to it. It is perhaps most appropriate to say that flat is any shape you want. In formal geometry, planar 
points occur with probability zero. However, in the case of uncertainty, there is a finite probability 
that the curvatures are not significantly different from zero. Then it becomes meaningful to consider a 
“flat” category. Of course, this does not imply that “flat” is a proper shape (see Appendix).
We then study the consistency of such judgments for given observers over repeated sessions, as 
well as the degree of agreement between observers for given locations. Both intra-observer consist-
ency and inter-observer agreement can be studied as a function of shape, for instance, by relating 
them to the median over numerous judgments. Notice that this does not involve any notion of “ground 
truth.” Thus the study is singularly limited to pictorial space.
2 Methods
2.1 The stimulus
In this study we use a photograph of a piece of sculpture by Andrew Smith (working as professional 
sculptor since 1989; Smith, 2014). It is simply labeled “Reclining Nude—Portland stone” (Figure 5). 
We do not know the exact size of the piece, nor the lighting set-up for the photograph, distance or focal 
length, etc. Portland stone is a limestone from the Tithonian stage of the Jurassic period quarried on the 
Isle of Portland, Dorset. It has found many uses in the UK, e.g., St Paul’s Cathedral and Buckingham 
Palace are constructed from it. It is an oolitic limestone that is so well cemented that it can be readily 
worked, and is quite suited to larger pieces of sculpture. What is important here is that it has slight texture, 
somewhat apparent in the image. Its surface scattering is diffuse, not all that different from Lambertian.
Most of the visible relief in the photograph is revealed through conventional “shading” (Baxandall, 
1995; Horn & Brooks, 1989; Lambert, 1760; Metzger, 1975; Ramachandran, 1988). The pose is such 
that the occluding contour is rather revealing. Occlusions (T-junctions—ending contour pairs) are of 
minor importance (waist, shoulders). Parts where the relief emerges from the block (legs, arm, part of 
the thorax) are clearly marked, and not easily confused with occluding contours. A few singular curves 
(cleft between the legs, cleft between the buttocks) are easily read, and not likely to be confused with 
occluding contours either. Thus this is a very revealing photograph of a generic (Koenderink, 1990; 
Porteous, 1994; Thom, 1972), predominantly smooth relief, which renders it eminently suitable to our 
purpose.
Figure 5. The stimulus is a photograph of a sculpture “Reclining Nude,” executed in Portland stone by Andrew 
Smith (http://www.assculpture.co.uk/reclining%20nude.html). The red line is a contour that defines the region of 
interest, the yellow dots show the 600 fiducial locations used to sample apparent surface shape.
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The piece is evidently illuminated from top right (Figures 6, 7). The (minor) cast shadows reveal 
three rather directional sources, from only slightly different directions. Thus most of the relief can be 
regarded as being illuminated through a single, directional, effective source. There are traces from 
diffuse reflexes (e.g., at the bottom left). Some “shading” is actually due to vignetting (cleft between 
the legs, arm pit).
The “reclining nude,” predominantly female, is a conventional topic in Western art (Clark, 1956; 
Rogers, 1969). Both dorsal and ventral views are common. The artistic interest is in the composition 
of overall pose and local anatomical detail. Different from common misconception, a piece like this 
is to be understood as a sophisticated abstract work. The nude is not a subject of art, but a form of art. 
Although major body parts can easily be named, which is quite useful in discussing the relief, this 
does not at all imply that one would know the relief without even looking at it. In fact, most of the 
important details could hardly be named by the naive observer. Who actually remembers the location, 
and shape of the infraspinatus, or teres minor and major? The anatomical knowledge of most observ-
Figure 6. Isophotes in the photograph of the “Reclining Nude.” In order to find them we first established the scale 
through Gaussian blurring by about half the edge length of the triangulation, followed by a “posterization,” again 
followed by an “edge finding” operation. The whole procedure is easily finished in Photoshop. This pattern defines 
the shading cue. One readily identifies the light direction (remember that the buttocks are almost spherical), the 
cylinder axes (legs, spinal area), and a variety of cylindrical points (most of the extrema, and all of the saddles in 
the dorsal thorax). Also notice the effect of the cast shadow of the upper buttock on the lower leg and the reflex 
at the lower left contour.
Figure 7. An impression of the screen layout. The “flat” category is added by way of a “don’t know” escape, and 
does not properly belong to the shape index scale. In fact, any shape, when sufficiently attenuated will become 
“flat.” One might say that flat is to shape, as black is to hue. The yellow dot indicates the fiducial location that 
identifies the trial. (For the sake of clarity, the size is enlarged in print.) The observer responds by clicking the 
appropriate category with the mouse. In this case the “cap” category will appear appropriate to most observers.
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ers is very limited anyway, and surface articulations easily as prominent as the nose are easily missed 
by non-professionals. But notice that although most people certainly could point out a nose in a face, 
they would be hard put to indicate its boundaries—even less so with a cheek. Such “knowledge” is 
very poor indeed. Even a medical training is only of limited use, because “artistic anatomy” is a topic 
by itself. In artistic anatomy one routinely merges objects that would be distinct to the medical person. 
The artistic taxonomy echoes the “Gestalt understanding” of the human form, not the anatomical one 
in the scientific sense (Bammes, 2002; Hamm, 1983; Hatton, 1910; Hogarth, 1958).
The bottom line is that the relief is largely an abstract entity to most observers. One is aware of 
an array of mutually interconnected “objects” that have a fleeting existence and constantly reorganize 
during continued scrutiny. Their lifetime is only a moment of visual awareness.
2.2 Set-up
The stimulus was presented on a DELL U2410f monitor, a 1,920 3 1,200 pixels liquid crystal display 
(LCD) screen, in a darkened room. The viewing distance was 78 cm. The stimulus filled the width of 
the screen. Above and below were free areas used for user interaction. In the upper area were placed a 
progress bar, a record of time spent in the session, and an analog clock showing time of day. The lower 
area was used for the actual user interface (see Figure 7).
In all cases, viewing was binocular, using open view, possibly using one’s regular correction. 
Interaction was by way of the mouse (see below). At each trial a mark (a filled dot) indicated a fiducial 
location, and the observer had to judge the local shape by clicking one of the categories presented just 
below the picture (Figure 7). Observers were instructed to approach the task very seriously and use all 
the time they needed to do that. Responses were collected as XML files and processed later, off-line. 
We recorded both response times and actual responses, although the response time data were hardly 
used. Trial sequence was randomized in all cases.
2.3 Observers
We used two distinct groups of observers. The first group of 10 observers was fully naive with respect 
to the aim of the experiment. Both genders were present in roughly equal proportions, all were aged 
in their 20s to 30s. Most had prior experience with various types of visual experiments. Each of these 
observers performed a single session. The second group of observers were the authors AD (female, in 
the 60s), JK (male, in the 70s), and JW (male, in the 50s). All are experienced with various psycho-
physical procedures, but effectively naive in the present task. They have some basic understanding 
of geometry, and of artistic vision, but are not active as mathematicians, nor as visual artists. Each 
repeated the session three times, at different dates. We discuss these groups separately, since different 
methods of analysis apply.
3 Results
3.1 First group
The first group comprises 10 observers. Our first concern is to check to what degree they yield mu-
tually similar results, and whether it is possible to detect obvious outliers from a global perspective. 
A first global check is to consider the response times. Although observers were instructed to go at 
their own speed, the duration of the session was long enough that they no doubt tried to economize. 
We find that the median response times vary from 2.1 to 3.7 s, with an interquartile range (i.q.r.) 
of 0.38 s. The interquartile ranges of all observers overlap, thus in that sense there are no obvious 
outliers.
Another global check is to consider the distribution over the categories over all locations. Here 
we find obvious differences (Figure 8). There can be little doubt that there exist very significant inter-
observer differences.
Of course, the distribution over locations is crucial. As a first check one may consider whether 
responses are consistent per location. A simple way to do this is to compare observers pairwise. For a 
given pair we consider only instances where both observers did not report “flat.” Since the responses 
are labeled by location, we may then simply consider a rank order correlation. We used the Kendall 
tau. It turns out that the observers correlate very significantly. The Kendall tau has a standard deviation 
of about 0.033. The correlations have a median value of 0.58 (i.q.r.: 0.49–0.66). A cursory glance at 
the distribution over all pairs (Figure 9) reveals one observer as an obvious outlier. It is observer #10, 
the one that is at the bottom of the sorted list shown in Figure 8.
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Figure 8. At left the distribution of the responses over the categories is shown for the first group of observers. 
Observers #1– #10 have been sorted by increasing fraction of “flat responses.” Here, as in all subsequent figures, 
we use the canonical color code shown at right for the shape categories (Koenderink & van Doorn, 1992): red—
cup, yellow—ridge, white—saddle, blue—rut, green—cup. We have indicated the flat category with black, which 
is colorless, thus indicating the lack of shape. Notice that opponent hues are used to encode opposite (as shape and 
mold) shapes, this is why the saddle is shown as white.
Figure 9. Here we consider the rank correlations (Kendall’s tau) for all pairs of observers. The colors indicate: 
orange: within the interquartile interval; red: above the 0.75 quartile; blue: below the 0.25 quartile. Notice that 
observer #10 is an obvious outlier.
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Although it is clear that observer #10 is an outlier and perhaps should be ignored when consider-
ing overall trends, it is of obvious interest to see in which respects this observer differs from the others. 
In order to find out, we need to consider the actual spatial distribution of responses. First, we study 
the overall consensus for all observers except #10 (Figure 10). The concordance is quite good; it is the 
least in the area of the back above the waist, with the exception of the spinal rut.
In comparison, the distribution for observer #10 is quite exceptional (Figure 11). This observer 
rates about 40 percent of the area as flat, and most of the remainder as ridge. A few cups and caps 
appear randomly scattered. A saddle area seems somewhat coherent, but apparently coincides with the 
points that the other observers frequently rated as “rut.” We conclude that this observer is hardly aware 
of a consistent pictorial relief at all. One might say that this observer experiences the stimulus largely 
veridically, that is to say, as a flat picture. This is the reason to omit the data of observer #10 from our 
overall assessment.
Figure 10. At top we show the consensus (by majority vote) for observers #1–#9, using the color code as in 
figure 8. At the bottom we show the distribution of mutual concordance, normalized on the temperature scale from 
blue (least) to red (best), shown at right.
Figure 11. The distribution of shape responses for observer #10. Notice that much of the area is judged flat, most 
of the remainder as convex cylindrical (ridge).
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In Figure 12 we plot the distribution of “flat” responses, averaged over the nine remaining observ-
ers. One notices an obvious pattern: the shape is well defined in the buttocks, spinal, and exposed 
shoulder areas; it is ill defined in the waist and the scapular areas.
Apart from the distribution of responses over locations, it is of much interest to study the dis-
tribution of responses over the categories. We summarize our findings in Figures 13 and 14. These 
figures are based on the pooled responses of observers #1– #9.
There are a few difficulties that need to be overcome in this study. A trivial, but serious problem 
is the very unequal distribution over the responded categories. Consider the pie-chart (over observers 
#1– #9) shown in Figure 13. This problem is most readily solved by normalizing over this unequal 
distribution. The only drawback is that the distribution for the cups will be far less precise than that 
over the ridges, and so forth. This is not too problematic. Below we will point it out where necessary.
More of a conceptual problem is that there does not exist anything like a notion of “ground truth.” 
The only solution appears to be to study the distribution of responses factored with respect to the aver-
age, or median response per location. We use the median for reasons of robustness. We obtain a set 
of responses for each median response; each set is normalized. The result is the distribution shown 
in Figure 14. The distribution is roughly concentrated about the main diagonal—such would be the 
“ideal” result—but there is a marked dispersion, especially in the saddle region.
Figure 12. The distribution of “flat” responses, averaged over the observers #1–#9. Gray tone represents the 
frequency of flat ratings. White means never, black means rated flat by all observers.
Figure 13. Pie chart of the distribution of categorical responses pooled over observers #1– #9 of group one.
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From Figure 14 we conclude that observers are not able to use the categorical scale with ultimate 
precision. They are quite precise in the cap (i.q.r.: 0.65 of 5), ridge (i.q.r.: 0.66), and rut (i.q.r.: 0.98) 
regions, but more variable in the saddle region (i.q.r.: 1.68). Because of the scarcity of instances we 
leave the cup region (i.q.r.: 2.01, but very variable) out of this discussion. An overall conclusion might 
be that observers are quite variable in the saddle region, where the uncertainty amounts to almost half 
the total scale (40%).
3.2 Second group
The second group of observers consisted of the authors. They did the full session three times, on differ-
ent dates. Thus we gain the advantage of looking at intra-observer variations. As a first overall check 
we ran the same analysis as for the first group on all sessions, thus treating the repeated sessions as due 
to different persons. We find results that do not appear to differ from those of group one. A first look 
at the data involves the spatial distribution of categorical responses over all observers and all sessions. 
It is presented in Figure 15.
In Figure 15 we spot both obvious differences as well as obvious similarities. These are per-
haps more easily studied in the overall consensus, and the distribution of mutual correspondences 
(Figure 16).
In Figure 16 we see that the consensus and mutual concordance are quite similar to those of the 
group of fully naive observers. Apparently these groups are largely comparable. The median rank 
correlations over the three sessions of an observer are 0.78 (AD), 0.81 (JK), and 0.77 (JW). Over all 
observers and all sessions the median rank correlation is 0.65 (i.q.r.: 0.60–0.73), thus the repeated 
sessions per observer are more similar than the observers are like each other. Apparently there exist 
Figure 14. The distribution of responses over categories, as a function of the median category response. These 
are the pooled results for the observers #1–#9. The distributions have been normalized per median category, 
that is to say, column wise. This normalization serves to remove the effect of the (very) different frequency of 
the categorical responses. The extremes are the 2,211 ridge versus the 10 cup responses. We omitted the flat 
responses. The colors are from a temperature scale, from blue (low density) to red (high density), as in figure 10. 
The red dots indicate the medians, the gray bars the interquartile ranges, of the distribution over a column. The cup 
category is based on so few instances that one should perhaps not attach too much importance on it. The width of 
the distribution at the saddle category is significantly larger than that of its ridge and rut neighbors.
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Figure 15. The distribution of categorical responses over all sessions for the three observers of group two.
Figure 16. At top we show the consensus (by majority vote) for all session of the observers of group two. At the 
bottom we show the distribution of mutual concordance, normalized on the temperature scale from blue (least) 
to red (best).
individual differences. Perhaps not unexpectedly, the observers of group two are—as a group—more 
coherent than those of group one. This induced us to do the final analysis we did for group one once 
over again, but only for the sessions of a single observer (necessarily of group two). The result is 
shown in Figure 17.
The result is striking to the extent that the observers of group two manage to retain their categori-
cal judgments over time. The only exceptions are near the cups-extreme, where the data are rather 
uncertain. Apparently categorical judgments of shape are possible, although there is only moderate 
consensus (median rank correlation: 0.65) over observers.
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4 Conclusions
Given the wide-ranging scope of the problem our conclusions must necessarily be of a preliminary 
nature. However, given the fact that essentially no quantitative researches have been published thus 
far, we trust that they are of some interest.
Perhaps the major drawback of this study is the fact that we used only a single stimulus. For a 
problem like this there is no “ground truth,” thus, in the conventional sense, “no stimulus” at all. A 
counter-measure might be to use a large set of mutually very different pictures. We have not done this, 
but consider it still reasonable to draw a few interesting preliminary conclusions.
We find that observers will readily judge the local shape of a pictorial relief on a five-point cat-
egorical shape index scale (see below), needing only a second or so for a “good look,” and with a 
spatial resolution that is at least some five percent of the picture width. At least, this holds true for our 
stimulus, where the major cues to pictorial shape are contour and shading, and the rough overall nature 
of the pictorial object is not in question.
Notice that we do not count “flat” as a category here. From a formal, geometrical point of view 
flat points may be ignored, because they do not generically occur on unconstrained surfaces. From an 
empirical point of view one expects any of the categories to evoke “flat” responses when the curva-
tures are subliminal for an observer. Thus “flat” is not a true category of shape, but is defined through 
a quantitative criterion. Flat is related to the shape-scale in a similar way as black is related to the 
hue-scale. In a study like this one might perhaps use the flat responses to gain some insight into the 
threshold for curvedness. Due to the scarcity of instances we have refrained from doing so.
The “precision” of the shape inferences is hard to describe. We draw the tentative conclusion 
that good observers can resolve the five-point categorical shape index scale easily, but that different 
observers may well disagree by up to about half of the total scale extent. This implies a number of 
rather important conceptual issues.
One issue is that it makes hardly any sense to average over observers. Such averages may indeed 
yield a population measure, but it severely misrepresents the abilities of individuals. Averages are per-
haps of interest for industry or government work, but rather less so to vision science.
Another issue is that “the” category at which one defines the spread is already a non-entity in the 
sense that it does not exist as an objective stimulus parameter. In this type of “experimental phenom-
enology” one has no option but to study the nature of the response in terms of properties of itself. This 
makes sense, because phenomenological research addresses the internal relations between aspects of 
awareness, rather than the relation of aspects of awareness to given objective stimulus parameters. The 
advantage is that experimental phenomenology addresses qualities and meanings, whereas psycho-
metric studies cannot go beyond objective—thus experientially devoid of meaning and quality—prop-
erties. Both approaches are necessary and important, albeit in mutually complementary ways.
A single observer is able to use the five-point shape index scale reliably over extended periods 
(days). We find this not too surprising, because the scale is a natural one, based on the sign of sectional 
curvature. All one needs to be able to do is to judge convexity/concavity in a few directions. It is hard 
to image that one would not be able to do this, except when the local relief appeared flat, as it occasion-
Figure 17. The distribution of responses over categories, as a function of the median category response for the 
sessions of each observer of group two (compare with Figure 14).
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ally does. Seeing curvature intuitively implies seeing its sign, an intuition that is by no means conclu-
sive. Thus, seeing something as curved (or “non-flat”) seems to imply that one will be able to use the 
scale. On the other hand, the ability to interpolate the scale would involve abilities of a quantitative 
nature, such as the ability to judge the foreshortening with respect to both direction and magnitude. 
This puts the continuous shape-index scale in an entirely different ball park.
Why are observers so obviously different? The issue may well be the absence of a proper “physi-
cal cause” of the awareness. For if all observers strive to attain a common physical target one indeed 
expects them to become similar. For instance, if all observers are instructed to shoot at the same 
physical target in front of them, for “target practice,” one would be surprised to find major systematic 
misses. The case of pictures is very different. Leonardo saw medieval battles in a dirty old wall, but 
what would a modern observer see in the same situation? It could be virtually anything, but a medieval 
battle scene would be highly unlikely.
A conclusion from the previous observation might well be that it will be of much interest to vary 
the cue-content of the stimulus pictures parametrically in this task. Thus the method may well become 
a tool to study pictorial perception per se.
What about observer #10 of group one, the obvious outlier? What seems to be the case here is that 
this observer did not experience pictorial relief, but experienced the screen of the monitor much like 
it was, which is flat. The observer apparently did not look into, but at the screen. Of course, it will be 
very hard to make such a guess objective. One method to do so is to test the person with a battery of 
methods and pictures, which would imply a major undertaking. Such an effort may become worth it 
when one had a sizable group, say at least half a dozen, of such observers. We believe it very likely 
that human observers that lack the usual “pictorial mode” exist (Koenderink et al., 2011). In fact, we 
believe to have met quite a few of them as “outliers” in a variety of experiments over the years. One 
encounters them not just among naive observers, but also among vision scientists. In the latter case one 
may discuss the nature of their awareness with the observers. We have met with a variety of interesting 
cases, like inability to become visually aware—as different from reasoning out—of concavities (van 
Doorn, Koenderink, Todd, & Wagemans, 2012).
As we mentioned in the introduction, in 1436 Alberti came up with a taxonomy of local surface 
shapes that was complete except for the omission of saddles. Moreover, it took till the work of Gauss 
(of 1827!) before this omission was amended. How was this possible? After all, most of the comments 
on Alberti stem from visual artists, or intellectuals interested in the visual arts. How come no one 
noticed the omission a century before Gauss? Our study fails to yield a complete answer. We find that 
our observers readily categorize local surface shapes as belonging to the saddle category. Moreover, 
individual observers do not fluctuate in their response to saddles over time. However, when one com-
pares a group of observers, one finds that the responses fluctuate much more heavily near the saddle 
category than in other parts of the scale. Apparently there is something special the case with the saddle 
category. It is unlikely to be a prior, because saddles are actually more frequent in nature than caps or 
cups (Koenderink & van Doorn, 2003; Lillholm & Griffin, 2007).
In summary, human observers readily categorize local pictorial relief in terms of cap, ridge, sad-
dle, rut, cup, and flat categories. They do this consistently, but the inter-observer variability is very 
significant. Although all observers globally “see the same object,” there are considerable differences 
in detail.
Acknowledgments This work was supported by the Methusalem program by the Flemish Government 
(METH/08/02), awarded to Johan Wagemans. We would like to acknowledge administrative support by Agna 
Marien and technical support by Rudy Dekeerschieter.
References
Alberti, L. B. (1972, original 1436). Della Pittura. (In English: On Painting. Harmondsworth: Penguin 
Classics). 
Ames, A. Jr. (1925a). The illusion of depth from single pictures. Journal of the Optical Society of America, 10, 
137–148. doi:10.1364/JOSA.10.000137 
Ames, A. Jr. (1925b). Depth in pictorial art. The Art Bulletin, 8, 4–24. doi:10.1068/i0585 
Bammes, G. (2002). Die Gestalt des Menschen. Stuttgart: Urania. doi:10.1007/s12064-002-0015-6 
Barrow, I. (1735). Geometrical lectures. London: Printed for Stephen Austen, at the Angel and Bible in St. 
Paul’s Church-Yard. doi:10.1007/978-3-642-29163-0 
203 Koenderink J, van Doorn A, Wagemans J
Baxandall, M. D. K. (1995). Shadows and enlightenment. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. doi:10.1364/
JOSAA.18.001804 
Bell, J. L. (1998). A primer of infinitesimal analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.4236/
jmp.2011.211172 
Claparède, E. (1904). Stéréoscopie monoculaire paradoxale. Annales d’Oculistique, 132, 465–466. 
doi:10.1080/00033795300200243 
Clark, K. (1956). The nude: A study in ideal form. Bollingen Series 35.2. New York, NY: Pantheon Books. 
Codazzi, D. (1868/1869). Sulle coordinate curvilinee d’una superficie dello spazio. Annali di Matematica Pura 
ed Applicata, 2, 101–119. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-00690-1 
Coxeter, H. S. M. (1961). Introduction to geometry. New York, NY: Blaisdell. 
Enright, J. T. (1991). Paradoxical monocular stereopsis and perspective vergence. In S. R. Ellis (Ed.), Pictorial 
communication in virtual and real environments (pp. 567–576). London: Taylor & Francis. 
Gauss, C. F. (1827). Disquisitiones generales circa superficies curvas. Göttingen: Königlichen Gesellschaft 
der Wissenschaften. (Presented to the Göttingen Royal Society, October 6, 1827.) First published 
Commentationes Societatis Regiae Scientiarum Gottingensis Recentiores, vol. VI. (Reprinted in Carl 
Friedrich Gauss Werke, Volume 4, pp. 217–258). 
Gibson, J. J. (1950). The perception of the visual world. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 
Hamm, J. (1983). Drawing the head and figure. New York, NY: Perigee. 
Hatton, R. G. (1910). Figure drawing. London: Chapman & Hall, Ltd. 
Hildebrand, A. (1893). Das Problem der Form in der bildenden Kunst. Strasbourg: Heitz. 
Hogarth, B. (1958). Dynamic anatomy. New York, NY: Watson-Guptill. 
Horn, B. K. P., & Brooks, M. J. (1989). Shape from shading. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Koenderink, J. J. (1990). Solid shape. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Koenderink, J. J., & van Doorn, A. J. (1992). Surface shape and curvature scales. Image and Vision Computing, 
10(8), 557–565. 
Koenderink, J. J., & van Doorn, A. J. (1995). Relief: pictorial and otherwise. Image and Vision Computing, 13, 
321–334. doi:10.1068/p130321 
Koenderink, J. J., & van Doorn, A. J. (2003). Local structure of Gaussian texture. IEICE Transactions on 
Information and Systems, 86(7), 1165–1171. doi:10.1023/A:1011126920638 
Koenderink, J. J., & van Doorn, A. J. (2012). Gauge fields in pictorial space. SIAM Journal on Imaging 
Sciences, 5, 1213-1233. doi:10.1137/120861151 
Koenderink, J. J., van Doorn, A. J., & Kappers, A, M. L. (1992). Surface perception in pictures. Perception & 
Psychophysics, 52, 487–496. doi:10.3758/BF03206710 
Koenderink, J. J., van Doorn, A. J., Kappers, A. M. L., & Todd, J. T. (2001). Ambiguity and the ‘mental eye’ in 
pictorial relief. Perception, 30, 431–448. doi:10.1068/p3030 
Koenderink, J. J., van Doorn, A. J., & Wagemans, J. (2011). Depth. i-Perception, 2, 541-562. doi:10.1068/
i0438aap 
Lambert, J. H. (1760). Photometria, sive, De mensura et gradibus luminis, colorum et umbrae. Augsburg: V. E. 
Klett. 
Leonardo da Vinci (1452–1519). Codex Urbinas. Gathered together by Francesco Melzi before 1542. First 
printed in French and Italian as Trattato della pittura by Raffaelo du Fresne in 1651. 
Lillholm, M., & Griffin, L. D. (2007). Statistics and category systems for the shape index descriptor of local 
image structure. Image and Vision Computing, 27(6), 771–781. doi:10.1016/j.imavis.2008.08.003 
Lotze, H. (1852). Medicinische psychologie oder physiologie der seele. Leipzig: Weidmann’sche Buchhandlung. 
Mainardi, G. (1856). Su la teoria generale delle superficie. Giornale dell’ Istituto Lombardo, 9, 385–404. 
doi:10.1016/0315-0860(79)90075-2 
Metzger, W. (1975). Gesetze des Sehens. Frankfurt am Main: Verlag Waldemar Kramer. 
Pollack, P. (1955). A note on monocular depth-perception. The American Journal of Psychology, 68(2), 
315–318. doi:10.2307/1418907 
Porteous, I. R. (1994). Geometric differentiation for the intelligence of curves and surfaces. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Ramachandran, V. S. (1988). Perceiving shape from shading. Scientific American, 259, 76–83. 
doi:10.1038/331163a0 
Rimmer, W. (1962, original 1877). Art anatomy. New York, NY: Dover. 
Rogers, L. R. (1969). The appreciation of the arts. Vol. 2: Sculpture. London: Oxford University Press. 
Sachs, H., (1990). Isotrope Geometrie des Raumes. Braunschweig: Friedrich Vieweg & Sohn. 
Schlosberg, H. (1941). Stereoscopic depth from single pictures. The American Journal of Psychology, 54(4), 
601–605. doi:10.2307/1417214 
Schwartz, A. H. (1971). Stereoscopic perception with single pictures. Optical Spectra, 5, 25–27.  
doi:10.1068/i0585 
Smith, A. (2014). http://www.assculpture.co.uk. (last visited April 2014). 
Copyright 2014 J Koenderink, A van Doorn, J Wagemans
Published under a Creative Commons Licence                                                                                a Pion publication
204 Koenderink J, van Doorn A, Wagemans J
Spelke, E. S. (2000). Core knowledge. American Psychologist, 55, 1233–1243. doi:10.1037/0003-
066X.55.11.1233 
Spivak, M. (1999). A comprehensive introduction to differential geometry (Vol III, 3rd ed.). Houston: Publish or 
Perish. 
Strubecker, K. (1941). Differentialgeometrie des isotropen Raumes. I. Theorie der Raumkurven. Akademie der 
Wissenschaften in Wien, Sitzungsberichte IIa, 150, 1–53. doi:10.1016/j.cagd.2013.02.008 
Strubecker, K. (1942a). Differentialgeometrie des isotropen Raumes. II. Die Flächen konstanter Relativ-
krümmung K = rt – s2. Mathematische Zeitschrift, 47, 743–777. 
Strubecker, K. (1942b). Differentialgeometrie des isotropen Raumes. III. Flächentheorie, Mathematische 
Zeitschrift, 48, 369–427. doi:10.1007/BF01180022 
Strubecker, K. (1944). Differentialgeometrie des isotropen Raumes. IV. Theorie der flächentreuen Abbildungen 
der Ebene. Mathematische Zeitschrift, 50, 1–92. doi:10.1007/BF01312437 
Thom, R. (1972). Structural stability and morphogenesis. San Francisco, CA: W. A. Benjamin. 
Vallortigara, G., Chiandetti, C., Rugani, R., Sovrano V. A., & Regolin, L. (2010). Animal cognition. Wiley 
Interdisciplinary Reviews, Cognitive Science, 1, 882–893. doi:10.1002/wcs.75 
van Doorn, A. J., Koenderink, J. J., Todd, J. T., & Wagemans, J. (2012). Awareness of the light-field: The case of 
deformation. i-Perception, 3, 467–480. doi:10.1068/i0504 
Yaglom, I. M. (1979). A simple non-euclidean geometry and its physical basis. New York, NY: Springer. 
Jan Koenderink is a retired Professor of Physics. He is currently a guest 
Professor at the University of Leuven and the University of Utrecht. In the 
past he has worked on a variety of topics in physics, mathematics, computer 
science, biology, psychology, and philosophy. His post-retirement hobby is the 
relation (two-way, and both conceptual and historical) between the science of 
perception and the visual arts.
Andrea van Doorn is a retired Associate Professor. She is currently a guest 
Professor at the University of Leuven and the University of Utrecht. Her 
background is in physics, and she has a long standing interest in many topics 
of human perception, both empirically and theoretically.
Johan Wagemans has a BA in psychology and philosophy, an MSc and a 
PhD in experimental psychology, all from the University of Leuven, where 
he is currently a full professor. Current research interests are mainly in 
so-called mid-level vision (perceptual grouping, figure-ground organization, 
depth, and shape perception) but stretching out to low-level vision (contrast 
detection and discrimination) and high-level vision (object recognition and 
categorization), including applications in autism, arts, and sports (see www.
gestaltrevision.be).
